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Comment
An Examination of the Current Status of
Rating Agencies and Proposals for
Limited Oversight of Such Agencies*
An analysis of the current market for ratings of both financial
securities and insurance companies reveals significant problems
with rating agencies, such as lethargy in changing ratings, politi-
cal influence, unsolicited ratings, and inaccurate ratings. Exami-
nation of various federal regulations indicates that the Securities
and Exchange Commission relies heavily on unregulated ratings
to exempt issuers of securities from disclosure and registration re-
quirements of federal regulations. To ensure that the federal se-
curities laws continue to protect investors, limited oversight of
rating agencies is recommended, including specific proposals. This
Comment proposes that Congress enact legislation granting the
SEC explicit authority to mandate that all nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) register with the SEC,
and to establish minimum standards for the designation of NR-
SROs. Finally, this Comment examines First Amendment con-
cerns associated with regulation of rating agencies, and concludes
that the proposed legislation set forth in this paper would not vio-
late the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
A rating by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization1
is more important now than ever before. These ratings,2 which mea-
sure the ability of a corporation issuing debt to repay the purchaser
of the debt,3 determine not only the cost of raising capital4 but often
1. Currently, there are six nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(NRSROs): Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Fitch, Duff & Phelps, Thomson Bankwatch,
and IBCA Banking Analysis Limited. Thomson Bankwatch, Inc., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,800, at 78,595 (Aug. 6,
1991). For a description of the process used to designate a NRSRO, see infra note 187
and accompanying text.
2. A rating is intended to indicate the probability that the firm issuing debt will
default, or not be able to repay the amount due at the end of the security's life. A rating
is a conservative estimate and reflects the rating agency's expectation of the minimum
level of quality that the issuing company will be able to maintain. See AHMED BELKAOUI,
INDUSTRIAL BONDS AND THE RATING PROCESS 15 (1983). Riskier debt receives lower
ratings. To compensate for lower ratings, issuing companies must pay higher interest
rates to attract purchasers.
3. Debt financing consists of issuing bonds, in which the issuing company promises
to pay the purchaser a specified amount of interest each year and to repay the purchaser
an amount stated on the face of the bond, known as the "face amount," at the end of the
bond's life. A bond's life ranges from 10 to 20 years. Debt may be preferred to equity for
various reasons, such as its effect on the company's debt/equity ratio and the politics of
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whether a corporation will survive.5 Many corporations are giving
disproportionate influence to ratings when making major decisions.
The ratings are also of paramount importance for city and state gov-
ernments, which increasingly must resort to the debt market to fi-
nance government operations.1
During the past decade the advent of new and complex variables
has both increased the need for rating agencies, because of added
market uncertainty, and complicated the job of the rating analyst.8
The rise of the junk bond market and greater event risk caused by
corporate control. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNER-
SHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 321-24 (4th ed. West 1990).
4. In February 1991, Standard & Poor's and Moody's downgraded some of
Chrysler's debt. Chrysler had guaranteed an issue of $1.1 billion of debt with interest
rates tied to its credit ratings. When its rating was lowered, its interest cost increased by
$38 million per year. Credit-rating Agencies: Beyond the Second Opinion, THE ECONO-
MIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 80. See also Agency Lowers GM Credit Rating, DETROIT FREE-
PRESS, Feb. 4, 1993, at 1E (downgrade of credit could result in GM having to pay as
much as $300 million more for the money it borrows).
5. One of the most famous recent examples of a company that has gone bankrupt
after a downgrade of its rating led to its subsequent inability to raise capital is Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. In November 1989, Standard & Poor's lowered the rating on the
company's commercial paper from A-2 to A-3. Within weeks, banks and other investors
refused to renew about $400 million in loans to the company. In February of the next
year, after unsuccessfully trying to obtain other financing, the company defaulted on
$100 million of commercial paper and filed for bankruptcy. See Robert J. McCartney,
Market Watch; 'Nerds' at Rating Agencies are Wall Street Prophets, L.A. TIMES, May
14, 1990, at D5. Another example of a company that failed due to inability to raise
capital after its rating was lowered by one of the rating agencies is Mortgage Realty
Trust. The company, a real estate investment trust, had its rating lowered in March
1990. Within 24 hours, banks began to cut off its credit. Mortgage Realty filed for bank-
ruptcy on April 12, 1990. Id.
6. See, e.g., Samuel Fromartz, Rating Agencies Wield Enormous Clout in Bond
Market, REUTER Bus. REP., Mar. 16, 1992 (General Motors Corporation's plan to fire
74,000 workers and close 21 plants was instigated by a review of the company's debt
rating by Moody's and Standard & Poor's); Victor F. Zonana, Are the Watchdogs
Watching?, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at Al (officials of Chemical Banking Corporation
and Manufacturers Hanover Corporation stated that one of the main purposes for the
merger of the two companies was to improve their credit rating). Standard & Poor's
recognizes that many companies incorporate specific rating objectives as corporate goals,
yet states that "managing [the corporation] for a very high rating can sometimes be
inconsistent with the company's ultimate best interests." S & P's CORPORATE FINANCE
CRITERIA 4 (Frank Rizzo & Solomon Samson eds., 1991).
7. A downgrade in a state's rating can result in an increase of millions of dollars in
interest that the state must pay the next time it wants to issue bonds. In April 1990, New
York State had its debt downgraded. At the time, it was predicted that the downgrade
would cost the state at least $40 million in interest to issue future bonds. See McCartney,
supra note 5, at D5.
8. Ida Picker, The Ratings Game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1991, at 73, 77
(major new concerns for credit analysts include event risk and covenant protection).
high-risk business strategies have increased the difficulty of deter-
mining ratings.' Today, a rating is not the stable and permanent as-
sessment of a financial security's risk that it used to be. Before 1980,
if an issue was rated AA, it was expected to remain AA throughout
the life of the security. Now, a rating might be good for as long as
five years or as short as six months.10 Debt downgrades by major
rating agencies have become increasingly prevalent during the last
decade. During the first half of 1991, ratings were downgraded 422
times compared to 88 upgrades.11 During 1990, downgrades of pub-
licly traded debt outnumbered upgrades by two to one.1 During the
first two quarters of 1992, corporate debt downgrades continued to
outnumber upgrades."
Ratings are not only more volatile and increasingly difficult to as-
sign, but are also assuming an unprecedented significance in both the
insurance industry' 4 and the securities marketplace."a Both consum-
ers and institutional investors rely heavily on ratings in deciding
whether to purchase a security. An estimated seventy-nine percent of
individual investors claim that a rating is the most important factor
in their investment decision.16 In addition, major governmental agen-
cies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in-
creasingly rely on ratings in promulgating major securities
regulations.'7 For example, the SEC recently prohibited the invest-
ment of money-market funds in commercial paper with a low rat-
ing. 8 The SEC also allows public companies to use Form S-3 to
register debt that has an investment-grade rating.' 9 The SEC also
allows registered brokers and dealers to use ratings to value bond
9. David Zigas, Why the Rating Agencies Get Low Marks on the Street, Bus.
WEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 106.
10. See Adrienne Linsenmeyer, Rating Game: Credit Rating Agencies Are Scram-
bling to Upgrade Themselves, FIN. WORLD, Aug. 21, 1990, at 56, 57.
11. Picker, supra note 8, at 77.
12. Linsenmeyer, supra note 10, at 56.
13. Credit Ratings: Downgrades by S&P on Corporate Debt Slowed in 2nd Pe-
riod, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1992, at CI 1.
14. See, e.g., Joseph L. Petrelli, On the Power of the Rating Agencies, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFIT MGMT. EDITION, Sept. 30, 1991, at
35; David C. Jones, Pomeroy Says NAIC Should Rate Rating Agencies, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER. PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFIT MGMT. EDITION, Aug. 12, 1991, at 1.
15. See, e.g., Abby Schultz, Wake-up Call for the Rating Agencies, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 28, 1991, at 18. See also infra note 154 and accompanying text.
16. Stephen Fidler, Most Investors Still Rely Heavily on Rating Agencies, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at 33.
17. See Roger Fillion, SEC Officials Clash Over Regulation of Rating Agencies,
REUTER Bus. REP., Aug. 13, 1992 ("What's more, even regulators have become increas-
ingly dependent on the data the rating agencies provide when setting rules for the stock
and bond markets.").
18. See Credit-rating Agencies: Beyond the Second Opinion, supra note 4.
19. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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assets for purposes of determining net capital requirements. 20
Ratings are also increasingly important in the insurance industry,which has assets of $1.6 trillion.2' Insurance companies hold hugeblocks of bonds as assets, and the ability of the insurance company
to pay policyholder claims depends upon the safety of these assets.
When First Executive Life was seized by state regulators on April11, 1991, it was the largest insurance company failure in United
States history.22 First Executive Life had a very high percentage of
its assets in junk bonds23 and many blamed the rating agencies for
not downgrading the company's rating soon enough.
Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy andCommerce Committee, is currently considering drafting legislation
proposing regulation of bond rating agencies. 24 Securities and Ex-change Commissioners Richard Roberts and Mary Schapiro have
also indicated support for regulation of rating agencies.15 However,
SEC chairman Richard Breeden has stated that he opposes regula-
tion of the rating agencies.26 In the insurance industry, the head of
20. The rating must be issued from a nationally recognized statistical rating organ-ization, as defined in the 1934 Act, Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15e3-l(c)(2)(vi)(F) (1992). A security is considered to be investment-grade if one of the fourhighest ratings is assigned to it by a NRSRO. 12 U.S.C. § 183le(d)(4)(A) (1992). As-sets rated investment-grade by a NRSRO receive haircut deductions ranging from 2% to9%. Id. Absent such a rating, assets are subject to much higher haircut deductions. 17C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(J). For Standard & Poor's, the security would have toreceive a rating of AAA, AA, A, or BBB. For Moody's, the security would have toreceive a rating of Aaa, Aa, A, or Baa. See BELKAOUI, supra note 2, at 11-14.21. Industry's Assets Rose 12.2% to $1.6 trillion at Year-end '91, NAT'L UNDER-WRITER: LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERvIcEs EDITION, June 8, 1992, at 10. Cf Gerald W.Perritt, Where the Money Is, FORBES, July 6, 1992, at 125 (insurance company assets
equal $1.52 trillion).
22. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.23. Junk bonds are bonds rated below investment-grade. See HAMILTON, supranote 3, at 321. First Executive Life had around 65% of its assets invested in junk bonds.This was more than 216% of the industry average. See infra note 67 and accompanying
text.
24. See Aaron Pressman, Dingell May Draft New Law Regulating Rating Agen-
cies, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., May 11, 1992, at 5.25. Roberts, Schapiro Seek Legislation Giving SEC Power Over Rating Agencies,24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1269, 1269 (1992); see also Roger Fillion, SEC Officials ClashOver Regulation of Rating Agencies, REUTER Bus. REP., Aug. 13, 1992 (noting thatCommissioners Roberts and Schapiro have called for a definition of what constitutes arating agency and for SEC power to oversee the agencies); Aaron Pressman, Two SECCommissioners Favor Regulating Ratings Agencies, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Aug.17, 1992, at 10 (Commissioners Roberts and Schapiro favor a legislative definition ofNRSRO and explicit authority for SEC to regulate the agencies).26. See Aaron Pressman, Dingell Demands Response from SEC ChairmanBreeden, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., July 20, 1992, at 11. See also Pressman, supra
note 25.
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has
called for regulation of the rating agencies.
2 7
This Comment examines the current status of rating agencies in
both the financial securities and insurance industries. Part I is an
examination of allegations of problems with ratings and rating agen-
cies. Although many insist that market competition ensures a proper
standard of care among rating agencies,2 s the existence of serious
problems in the industry refutes this proposition. Part I includes ex-
amination of allegations of the slowness of rating agencies in down-
grading ratings (subpart A), political influence (subpart B),
unsolicited ratings (subpart C), and inaccuracy and lack of disclo-
sure (subpart D). Part II is an analysis of the Securities and Ex-
,change Commission's reliance on ratings to justify exempting issuers
of financial securities from disclosure requirements. Part III includes
recommendations for limited regulation of rating agencies by the
SEC and the NAIC. Part IV examines First Amendment concerns
with the legislation proposed in Part III.
I. REBUTTAL OF THE ASSERTION THAT THE MARKET EFFICIENTLY
DISCIPLINES RATING AGENCIES: LETHARGY, POLITICS,
UNSOLICITED RATINGS, AND INACCURACY AND LACK OF
DISCLOSURE
A. Lethargy In Downgrading A Rating
(i) The Financial Securities Market
29
The strongest argument that the market is not effectively ensuring
a proper standard of care among the rating agencies is the existence
27. David C. Jones, Pomeroy Says NAIC Should Evaluate Rating Agencies,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Aug. 19, 1991, at 6.
28. See, e.g., Vicky Stamas, Only a Minority Backs Creating More Rules as Mar-
ket Debates Rating Agency Role, BOND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1992, at 1 (majority of securi-
ties market participants responding to SEC's request for comments on proposal to
exempt highly-rated structured financings from registration requirements opposed further
regulation of rating agencies); Christopher Dauer, Criticisms Lead to Minor Changes by
Rating Agencies, NAT'L UNDERWRITER. PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFIT MOMT.
EDITION, June 22, 1992, at 53, S25 (S&P's Ron Taub claims rating agencies are effec-
tively monitored by the marketplace); Fillion, supra note 25 (SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden claims agencies are already subject to strong discipline from financial markets);
Gregory Husisian, Comment, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World's
Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 411, 425-26 (1990) (market is a sufficient check on rating agencies).
29. Six players compose the financial securities ratings market: Standard & Poor's,
Moody's Investor's Service, Inc., Fitch, Duff & Phelps, Thomson Bankwatch, and IBCA
Banking Analysis Limited. Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch have all been issuing
ratings since the early 20th century. Louis H. Ederington & Jess B. Yawitz, The Bond
Rating Process, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (Edward I.
Altman et al. eds., 6th ed. 1987). "Moody's started rating railroad bonds in 1909 and
started issuing ratings for utility and industrial debt in 1914. Poor's began issuing ratings
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of serious problems afflicting the ratings market. Perhaps the most
frequent and long-standing complaint against rating agencies is that
they are too slow to downgrade a rating.30
In 1975,1 both Standard & Poor's and Moody's were heavily crit-
icized for waiting too long to change New York City's bond rating.
3 2
Standard & Poor's changed its rating in April 1975, and Moody's
changed its rating the following October. However, critics com-
plained that obvious warning signs that existed the previous fall
should have caused the rating agencies to downgrade the state's debt
rating sooner.33 Critics not only charged the two agencies with being
slow to downgrade, but also with a complete failure to investigate
the city's fiscal problems.3 4
In 1983, the two rating agencies were criticized for being too slow
to downgrade bonds issued by the Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS). 5 WPPSS had issued $8.3 billion of bonds to fi-
nance the construction of five nuclear power plants. WPPSS eventu-
ally defaulted on $2.25 billion of the bonds, representing that portion
of the bonds issued to finance construction of the fourth and fifth
in 1922 and Standard Statistics in 1923. The two merged into Standard & Poor's in
1941. Fitch ratings appeared in 1923." Id. at 23-4 to 23-5. The first three rating agencies
disseminate public ratings and use similar rating symbols. Id. Duff & Phelps began
rating utility bonds in the 1930s, but did not issue public ratings until 1980. Private
ratings are ratings only available to the customer, and are not disseminated to the gen-
eral public.
This Comment will focus on Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and Standard & Poor's.
These two organizations dominate the financial securities market for ratings, which is a
differentiated oligopoly. In a differentiated oligopoly, several players produce similar yet
differentiated products. A. AsIMAKOPULOs, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY:
MICROECONOMIcs 219, 311 (1978).
30. See, e.g., Jonathan Fuerbringer, Chrysler Notes Are Well Received, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at D14 ("The sale of the notes prompted the usual remarks in the
bond market about credit rating agencies and what many in the market say is their
lateness in lowering or raising a company's rating.").
31. Criticism regarding failure of Moody's and Standard & Poor's to change a
rating quickly enough predates 1975. Though this Comment focuses on problems cur-
rently posed by the rating agencies, a sampling of significant past problems is presented
to demonstrate the continuity of the problems. For an example of pre-1975 complaints,
see Marilyn Much, The Rating Game: When Baa Spells Bah, INDUSTRY WEEK, Jan. 8,
1979, at 45-46 (both agencies criticized in early 1970s for sluggishness in changing rat-
ings); JOHN E. PETERSEN. THE RATING GAME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON MUNICIPAL BOND CREDIT RATINGS (1974) [hereinafter RATING
GAME] (analysis of problems with ratings in the municipal bond industry).
32. See Bradley Graham, Mystery Pervades Rating Agencies' Bond Market Role,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1978, at Fl. See also Zonana, supra note 6, at Al.
33. Graham, supra note 32, at Fl.
34. Id.
35. Peter Brimelow, Shock Waves from WHOOPS Roll East, FORTUNE, July 25,
1983, at 46. See also Zonana, supra note 6, at A14.
nuclear plants. It was the largest bond default in securities history.36
In May 1981, construction cost increases resulted in a suspension of
construction of plants four and five. When efforts to raise additional
financing proved unsuccessful, WPPSS abandoned construction on
the two plants.3
WPPSS intended to repay the $2.25 billion of bonds by relying on
participation agreements entered into with eighty-eight publicly
owned regional utilities. These participation agreements obligated
the utilities to pay for the costs of the projects regardless of whether
the projects were ever completed. In June 1983, however, the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that certain of the regional utili-
ties, whose combined participation agreements represented sixty-
eight percent of the cost of the projects, lacked authority to enter
into the agreements.3 On remand to the Washington Superior
Court, the remaining participants' agreements were held to be unen-
forceable. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, thus
releasing the remaining participants from liability.40 After this rul-
ing, WPPSS had no means of repaying the bonds, and was forced to
default. The default resulted in many lawsuits being filed against
WPPSS and other defendants, including Standard & Poor's and
Moody's.4 1 The suits alleged material misrepresentations or omis-
sions in the bond prospectuses. 42 Additionally, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission investigated the default.43
36. SEC Closes WPPSS Investigation, Without Bringing Enforcement Action, 20
SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1435 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash.
1983), affid on reh'g, 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
40. 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
41. The litigation included a class action which was settled in 1988 by payment of
more than $580 million, before interest. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 720 F. Supp.
1379 (D. Az. 1989), afl'd 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992). Four previously approved
settlement agreements involved payments of an additional $107 million. Id. at 1275. See
Judge Signs Order Settling Class Suit Brought Against WPPSS for Bond Default, 20
SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1720 (1988).
42. 955 F.2d 1268, 1274-75.
43. The SEC chose not to pursue enforcement action against WPPSS because of
the plethora of private litigation against WPPSS and prohibitive discovery costs. See
SEC Closes WPPSS Investigation Without Bringing Enforcement Action, supra note 36,
at 1435. However, the SEC noted that serious problems existed with investors obtaining
information regarding municipal bonds, especially when the bonds are purchased in sec-
ondary markets. In order to attempt to remedy this deficiency, and to reduce the likeli-
hood of future defaults of municipal bonds, the SEC approved Rule 15c2-12 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See New SEC Rule Will Require Underwriters in
Bond Offerings to Distribute Data, 21 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 936, 937 (1990). The rule
became effective January 1, 1990, and requires underwriters participating in municipal
bond offerings exceeding $1 million to obtain and review copies of almost all official
statements by the bond issuer before bidding for or purchasing an offer. The rule also
requires underwriters to make available copies of such final statements to investors who
request them. Id. The rule was based largely on the SEC's investigation of the WPPSS
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Critics charged that Moody's and Standard & Poor's failed to
downgrade the bonds despite awareness of serious difficulties and
cost overruns involved with construction of the plants.44 A bond re-
search company, L.F. Rothschild Unterberg Towbin, had suspended
its ratings on the bonds in June 1981, six months before Moody's
took similar action.45 Presumably, the rating agencies did not lower
the rating because the WPPSS was a quasi-government agency and,
thus, was very secure because of its ability to ensure debt payments
through the sale of electricity. The rating agencies cannot be faulted
for failing to predict the decision by the Washington Supreme Court.
However, the rating agencies could have dropped their rating at least
one notch. This would have alerted investors that some change had
occurred, and allowed them to conduct their own investigation.
Maintaining a high rating despite huge cost overruns gave the false
impression that all was well.46
Critics also wondered whether the agencies had too collegial a re-
lationship with the WPPSS. Both agencies received a combined total
of over $400,000 in the ten years preceding 1983 from the
WPPSS.47 At Moody's, an employee who wanted to downgrade the
bonds earlier was overruled, and later quit.
48
default, which noted that none of the rating agencies took responsibility for conducting
adequate investigation of the bond offerings. Id.
44. See Brimelow, supra note 35, at 46. For a detailed account of the WPPSS
saga, see Peter W. Bernstein, A Nuclear Fiasco Shakes the Bond Market, FORTUNE,
Feb. 22, 1982, at 100.
45. See Brimelow, supra note 35, at 47.
46. The rating agencies were not the only ones to prevent crucial information from
being disseminated to the public. The Securities and Exchange Commission's investiga-
tion into the matter revealed that WPPSS failed to disclose important events. For exam-
ple, it failed to disclose that it had been asked by the participating utilities in October
1980 to consider possible termination of the project. It also failed to disclose in Novem-
ber 1980 a $4.5 billion estimated budget increase. SEC Closes WPPSS Investigation
Without Bringing Action, supra note 36, at 1436. Thus, the rating agencies were not the
only ones to blame for the lack of disclosure of important information concerning the
bonds to the public. However, the type of information that WPPSS failed to disclose was
precisely the type of information that the rating agencies had special access to because of
their relationship with WPPSS. Thus, the rating agencies are equally as culpable as
WPPSS for failing to timely disclose such information.
47. Brimelow, supra note 35, at 47. Suggestions of conflict of interest have also
been raised with respect to ratings of insurance companies. See Eric N. Berg, Insurers'
Raters Are on the Spot For Inaccuracy, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at Al, A36 ("An-
other complaint is what critics call a conflict of interest. Insurers pay Moody's and Stan-
dard & Poor's up to $30,000 a year for ratings. A. M. Best rates insurers for a nominal
sum, but is constantly selling industry guides, reports and newsletters to insurers and
agents. Because the ratings agencies depend on the industry for revenues, the agencies
might be reluctant to cut ratings, critics contend.").
48. Brimelow, supra note 35, at 46-47.
Another example of a situation in which critics alleged lethargy by
the rating agencies in downgrading a bond's rating is Integrated Re-
sources. On Thursday, June 15, 1989, the company announced that
it would default on $1.5 billion of bonds and commercial paper.49
Standard & Poor's had rated the commercial paper A2 (borderline
investment-grade) until the day before.50 The next day Standard &
Poor's downgraded its rating to CCC-, a low junk bond rating.5 1 In-
tegrated Resources' stock, that had traded at $17.38 on May 15,
1989, and at $15.38 on June 13, 1989, dropped to $6.25 on June 15,
1989.52 Many people criticized the rating agencies for waiting too
long to downgrade the rating. Although both Standard & Poor's and
Moody's had put the company on CreditWatch,53 neither actually
downgraded the rating until the day the default was announced. 4
The failure of the rating agencies to downgrade Integrated Re-
sources' debt earlier left even some sophisticated investors who had
relied on the rating without a remedy.5
49. See Kurt Eichenwald, Integrated Resources to Default, N. Y. TIMES, June 16,
1989, at Dl.
50. Zigas, supra note 9, at 108.
51. Eichenwald, supra note 49, at DI.
52. Mary Kuntz, Debt Wobbles Integrated Resources, NEWSDAY, June 26, 1989,
at 3.
53. CreditWatch, pioneered in 1981, refers to an announcement by a rating agency
that it is re-evaluating the condition of the issuer. CreditWatch is supposed to alert the
public that a rating change may be imminent. Linsenmeyer, supra note 10, at 56. How-
ever, people in the industry claim that CreditWatch is not effective because most compa-
nies are downgraded without being placed on CreditWatch. In addition, a CreditWatch
announcement leads to an instant adjustment of the market price of the company's debt
to reflect the potential for a downgrade. Id. The ratings of most of the companies
placed on CreditWatch, however, are not changed. According to Ken Pinkes, Moody's
vice-president in charge of financial institutions, Moody's only ends up changing about
half of the companies that it places on CreditWatch. Id. Standard & Poor's
CreditWatch announcements are announced in a weekly publication called CREDITWEEK.
See, e.g., S & P'S CREDITWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992 (Matthew J. Korten ed.). A subscription
to Creditweek cost $1,865 per year in 1992.
54. Stephanie Cooke, Integrated Resources: Where Were the Rating Agencies?,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1989, at 28.
55. For an example of sophisticated investors who detrimentally relied on the rat-
ing of Integrated Resources in purchasing loan participations from a bank, see Banco
Espafiol de Cr6dito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1992). In
that case, two groups of institutional investors had purchased loan participations from
Security Pacific National Bank of a short-term loan which the bank had made to Inte-
grated Resources. A loan participation is a sale of a loan from one institution to another.
It provides benefits to both parties: the seller, or primary lender, benefits by spreading
the risk that the borrower will default; the purchaser of the loan participation benefits by
receiving interest greater than that available on comparable money market instruments.
Id. at 53.
Security Pacific did not disclose to the purchasers of the loan participation that it had
refused, in April 1989, to extend further credit to Integrated Resources. Instead, Secur-
ity Pacific only provided the purchasers with Integrated Resources' publicly available
debt rating. Id. at 56-57 (Oakes, Chief J., dissenting). Even though the investors had
signed a disclaimer stating that they had independently investigated the creditworthiness
[VOL. 30: 579. 1993] An Examination of Rating Agencies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
(ii) The Insurance Industry
In the insurance industry, the rating agencies have also been criti-
cized for being too slow to downgrade the ratings of insurance com-
panies. In 1984, critics charged that A.M. Best Company"6 was slow
to downgrade Ideal Mutual Insurance Company of New York.
57
Best had downgraded the company to C from A only four months
before it entered rehabilitation in December 1984.58 Similar allega-
tions were levied against Standard & Poor's and A.M. Best after the
collapse of First Capital in 1991. By spring of 1991, it was common
knowledge in the insurance industry that First Capital had large
holdings of speculative junk bonds. Pension fund managers had be-
gun to discontinue investment in First Capital.59 Still, Standard &
Poor's maintained an investment-grade rating, BBB, of First Capital
until May 7, 1991, one week before the insurer was taken over by
the California Insurance Commissioner. First Capital retained a rat-
ing of A-, or excellent, by Best until the day of the takeover. 60
Rating agencies were also heavily criticized when First Executive
Life was seized by California state regulators on April 11, 1991.61 It
was the largest insurance company failure in United States history.
62
of Integrated Resources, and were not relying on representations made by Security Pa-
cific, the investors relied solely on the rating. Id. at 53. When Integrated defaulted on its
loan in June 1989, the purchasers of the loan participations were left without a remedy.
They could not recover under § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 because the court deter-
mined that the loan participation was not a security. They could not recover under a
common-law fraud cause of action because they had signed the disclaimer. Id. at 54.
Thus, sophisticated investors who relied on Integrated Resources rating were left without
recourse when Integrated defaulted. See also 'Loan Notes' Sold by Bank are Securities,
SEC Tells CA 2 in Brief, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 172, 172-73 (1992) (detailing case
and noting that borrower only provided purchasers with ratings by credit rating
agencies).
56. A.M. Best Co. is an insurance-company rating agency. It does not rate finan-
cial securities as do Moody's and Standard & Poor's. For a description of A.M. Best, see
NAIC REPORT, infra note 126, at 105-06.
57. See, e.g., Michael Schachner & Douglas McLeod, Rating Agencies: Do They
Do the Job? Burned Policyholders Sue Following Failures, Bus. INs., Aug. 5, 1991, at 1,
31.
58. Id.
59. See Berg, supra note 47, at Al.
60. Id. Best's spokesman, Paul Wish, commented that the reason that Best main-
tained its rating until the day First Capital was taken over was that Best had not fac-
tored into its rating analysis whether an insurer could survive a run (a massive
withdrawal of funds by investors). Id. In August 1991, Best announced that it would
begin to include such a possibility when performing its rating analysis. Id.
61. See Sabin Russell, State Takes Over Insurer That Was Big in Junk Bonds,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 12, 1991, at Al.
62. See Jay Greene, Judging the Soundness of Insurers, DAILY NEws OF L.A.,
Apr. 14, 1991, at BI.
In 1991, First Executive Life had 170,000 policies nationwide with a
face value of $38 billion, 75,000 annuity contracts worth $2.5 billion,
and 300 guaranteed investment contracts worth more than $3 bil-
lion.63 Prior to January 1990, Best had rated First Executive Life A,
Standard & Poor's had rated it AAA, and Moody's had rated it
A3.64 Beginning in January, all three agencies began a rapid series
of downgrades, eventually rating the bonds lower than investment-
grade. Critics of the rating agencies claimed that waiting until Janu-
ary to downgrade the debt was reprehensible because the ability of
First Executive Life to pay interest obligations on its outstanding
bonds had been substantially undermined for several years due to the
company's high percentage of junk bonds in its investment portfolio.
An analysis of the events leading up to January 1990 reveals that
both public and private information6 5 provided ostensible warning
signs that should have caused the rating agencies to downgrade First
Executive Life's rating.66 When First Executive Life of California
failed, more than sixty-five percent of its assets were in junk bonds.17
The insurance industry as a whole in 1990 only had three percent of
its $1.3 trillion in assets invested in junk bonds.68
First Executive Life's problems began in 1974 when its chairman,
Fred Carr, joined the company. In 1978 Carr pioneered the com-
pany's introduction of single-premium deferred annuities. 9 These
annuities, which promised investors a large return in the future for a
relatively small present investment, became very popular and re-
sulted in remarkable growth for Executive Life.70 As the company
realized tremendous gains in profitability and net worth, it received
63. Russell, supra note 61.
64. Kathy M. Kristoff, Lax Regulators Are Blamed for Insurer's Fall, L.A. TIMEs,
Sept. 1, 1991, at Dl.
65. Public information refers to any information available to the general public,
such as newspapers, journals, and the media. Private information is that information not
available to the general public, yet available to the rating agencies because of their rela-
tionship to the issuer. The issuer discloses confidential corporate information to the rating
agencies during and after the rating process. See, e.g., S & P's CORPORATE FINANCE
CRITERIA, supra note 6, at 9. "A substantial portion of the information set forth in com-
pany presentations is highly sensitive and is provided by the issuer to S&P only for the
purpose of arriving at ratings .... It is not used for any other purpose, or by any third
party . . . ." This information is also available to the rating agency subsequent to the
issuance of the rating, during the "surveillance and review" portion of the rating agency's
job. Id. at 10. S&P meets at least once a year with the issuer of the debt, at which time
the issuer presents S&P with confidential corporate information and reveals its plans for
the future. Id.
66. See Zonana, supra note 6, at Al ("Consistently, the ratings agencies continued
to give top rating to [Executive Life and First Capital Life] at a time when anybody with
a room temperature IQ in the industry knew they were in trouble.") (quoting Richard H.
Bryan (D-Nev)).
67. Kristof, supra note 64, at D16; Russell, supra note 61, at Al.
68. John Waggoner, Life Insurance: Safe Bet?, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1990, at B I
69. Kristof, supra note 64, at D16.
70. Id.
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high ratings from the rating agencies." Carr was taking home mil-
lion-dollar paychecks and receiving rave reviews in newspapers and
magazines. 2 Carr financed the annuities with a portfolio of assets
that contained over 216% more junk bonds than the industry aver-
age.7 3 Despite the fact that these junk bonds were financial instru-
ments of unproven reliability, and the fact that First Executive Life
had such an incredibly high ratio of junk bonds in its portfolio, the
rating agencies maintained an investment-grade rating for the com-
pany until a year before it was seized by state regulators in
California.
Several times before 1986 state regulators had contended that
First Executive Life's net worth had been overstated by tens of mil-
lion of dollars.74 In 1986, California state regulators forced the com-
pany to reduce its reported net worth by $180 million.7 5 Even though
this information was not generally disseminated to the public,7 16 the
rating agencies either had such information or could have obtained it
through minimal investigation. Because the agencies were privy to
the company's financial information, a routine examination of the
company's financial statements would have revealed the significant
decrease in reported net worth.7
71. Id.
72. Id. However, no one took notice of the fact that the mutual fund that Carr had
managed at his previous job collapsed shortly after his departure. Id.
73. Waggoner, supra note 68; Kristof, supra note 64. See also Jay Greene, Insur-
ance Regulators Seize Executive Life, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Apr. 12, 1991, at Ni ($6.4
billion of First Executive Life's $10.1 billion in assets invested in junk bonds).
74. Kristof, supra note 64, at D16.
75. Id. First Executive Life had exaggerated its net worth by claiming huge im-
proper reinsurance credits. Reinsurance is a procedure by which one insurance company
sells a portion of its policies to another insurance company in order to spread risk. Regu-
lators in both New York and California found these credits to be phony. Id. New York
regulators fined First Executive Life of New York $250,000, required it to raise its capi-
tal, and barred three executives from signing financial statements issued by the company.
Id.
76. See Kristof, supra note 64, at D16 (noting that investors were not generally
aware of First Executive Life's problems with state regulators).
Publicly held insurance companies file two annual reports. One, based on generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), is sent to shareholders. First Executive Life's
GAAP financial statement did not disclose much about the regulatory problems. Id. The
second required report is based on regulatory accounting principles (RAP) and is sent to
state regulators. Id. Thus, neither of these two reports effectively informed the public
about the regulators' reprimand of the company. Additionally, the regulators' actions did
not increase public awareness. Although the California examiners required First Execu-
tive Life to correct financial statements filed in California, they did not require the com-
pany to change statements filed in other states in which the company did business. Id. at
Dl.
77. The decrease left First Executive Life with only $90 million in net worth. Id.
Pressured by state regulators in California to increase capital,
First Executive Life obtained a $170 million loan from Executive
Life of New York in December 1987.78 Though the company re-
ported this as an asset in its financial statement of December 31,
1987, it did not receive the money until the following year. The rat-
ing agencies downplayed this intentional falsification as a technical
violation, and assessed its impact as minimal on the company's finan-
cial health." Critics have complained that the rating agencies should
have investigated the situation more carefully and downgraded the
debt to reflect the company's significantly impaired ability to meet
the interest obligations on its debt.
Events between 1988 and 1991 revealed the company's financial
distress. Information regarding these events was largely public and
makes reprehensible the rating agencies' failure to downgrade First
Executive Life's rating more quickly. In December 1988, the com-
pany, desperate to increase capital, exchanged $700 million in junk
bonds for collateralized bond obligations.80 These new securities,
however, were backed by similar junk bonds. When state regulators
finally found out about the transaction a year later, they voided the
transaction.8'
In March 1989, Michael Milken, the head of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, was indicted on charges of insider trading."2 First Execu-
tive Life's parent, First Executive Corporation, had been the largest
single buyer of the junk bonds sold by Milken. 83 First Executive Life
posted the biggest annual loss in its history in 1989 due to losses
from its junk bond portfolio."4 Despite all this, the rating agencies
did not lower their ratings of First Executive Life.""
In March 1990, the Securities and Exchange Commission began
an investigation of First Executive Life's financial reporting prac-




80. Id. The company took a huge credit on its balance sheet for reducing the riski-
ness of its portfolio.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Russell, supra note 61, at Al.
84. Kristof, supra note 64, at D16.
85. The rating agencies were not the only ones that delayed taking action. State
regulators in New York and California also failed to act despite knowledge of the in-
surer's problems. See Fred Perlmutter & Frank Russo, Regulating at a Snail's Pace;
State Regulation of Financially Troubled Insurers Is Inadequate, Uneven, BEST'S RE-
VIEW, PROP./CASUALTY INS. EDITION, Dec. 1992, at 22 ("Despite their knowledge of
Executive Life's questionable investments, improper reinsurance, improper affiliate trans-
actions and loss reserve deficiencies, regulators did not act promptly to correct the
problems or to minimize their effects.").
86. Id.
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more than $3 billion out of the company. After the company posted
another devastating loss in March 1990, more policyholders hurried
to withdraw their assets. Standard & Poor's, though it had lowered
its rating to BBB, still maintained that the company was secure.
However, even magazine writers were counseling policyholders to
abandon their investments in First Executive Life.87 In April, regula-
tors in New York and California finally seized the company and
placed temporary bans on policyholder withdrawals. 88
Just days after regulators seized First Executive Life on April 11,
1991, lawsuits began to be filed against the company's directors and
executives, and against the rating agencies. By August, Standard &
Poor's, Best, and Moody's had been named in more than twenty law-
suits filed by policyholders.8 Significantly, Duff & Phelps was never
named in any of these lawsuits. Duff & Phelps never rated First Ex-
ecutive Life higher than BBB after 1988. It gave realistic weight to
the obvious risk of default from the company's huge junk bond hold-
ings. 0 This emphasizes the negligence of the other rating agencies in
failing to downgrade their ratings sooner. All the rating agencies had
access to the same information and should have downgraded much
earlier than they did.
One suit, filed in April 1991 in Superior Court of San Francisco,
was brought on behalf of a twelve-year-old girl whose annuity was
managed by First Executive Life.91 The complaint alleged that First
Executive Life's chairman, Fred Carr, worked together with Michael
Milken to maintain the price of junk bonds artificially high by buy-
ing huge amounts of junk bonds from Milken and other firms.92 The
suit claimed that the girl's annuity was in jeopardy because of First
Executive Life's high-risk portfolio. The suit also named as defend-
ants Moody's and Standard & Poor's. It claimed that the two rating
agencies negligently maintained high ratings for First Executive Life
until 1990, thus deceiving investors by suggesting that the company
was financially stable.93
Most of the other lawsuits filed against the agencies make similar
87. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Checking Out the Junk Shop, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9,
1991, at 46 ("Ask your employer who backs up your guaranteed-investment contract. If
Executive Life is in the mix, it costs you nothing to switch to another investment.").
88. Id.
89. Schachner & McLeod, supra note 57, at 1.
90. Id. at 31.




allegations.94 They all charge the agencies with negligence and mis-
representation in failing to warn of the riskiness of First Executive
Life's extensive junk bond holdings. Some have even characterized
the rating agencies' failure to downgrade earlier as recklessness. 6
On February 21, 1992, California Commissioner of Insurance
John Garamendi filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court against
First Executive Life's Fred Carr, Michael Milken, A.M. Best,
Moody's, and Standard & Poor's.96 Garamendi, suing on behalf of
policyholders of First Executive Life, charged the rating agencies
with fraud, deceit, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.
Garamendi's complaint stated that the rating agencies negligently
misrepresented First Executive Life's financial strength by maintain-
ing a high rating for the company, despite First Executive Life hold-
ing a portfolio of junk bonds far in excess of any other insurance
company.97 Garamendi also noted that the rating agencies' failure to
downgrade was negligent because they had access to confidential
corporate information that belied the ratings' suggestion that the
company was financially sound."8 Milken has already settled for
$100 million.99
In all these cases, no one charges the agencies with negligence in
assessing the initial rating. However, as the First Executive Life fi-
asco illustrates, failure of the rating agencies to downgrade a rating
quickly enough is a serious problem. The rating agencies frequently
downplay their ratings as mere opinions.100 The extreme importance
94. One suit filed in New York State Supreme Court accuses the rating agencies
of misrepresenting First Executive Life's financial condition. Id. Another suit filed in
U.S. District Court in New York charges the agencies with violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and fraudulent concealment of the
company's financial condition. A similar charge has been made by a Senate panel, which
suggested that First Executive Life may have been assisted by the rating agencies in
presenting a misleading picture of financial stability. Id. (accusation made in a letter
from the Senate panel to the U.S. Justice Department requesting an investigation of
First Executive Life's failure).
95. See, e.g., Schachner & McLeod, supra note 57, at 31 ("'[The rating agen-
cies] did an inadequate investigation of Executive Life's condition and acted recklessly in
maintaining its rating' ") (quoting Melvyn Weiss, an attorney who represents plaintiffs in
New York and California in lawsuits against the rating agencies).
96. See Rhonda L. Rundle, First Executive Chief, Auditor Sued for Fraud; Cal-
ifornia Insurance Official Charges S&P, Moody's, Best As Well As Milken, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 28, 1992, at A3; Kathy M. Kristof, State Sues Over Failure of Exec Life, L. A.
TIMEs, Feb. 29, 1992, at DI; Meg Fletcher & Michael Schachner, Rating Firms, Others
Sued in ELIC Collapse, Bus. INs., Mar. 2, 1992, at 3; California Insurance Commis-
sioner Sues Former Executive Life Officers, Others, BNA SEc. L. DAILY, Mar. 11, 1992,
available in WESTLAW, BNA-SLD database.
97. Kristof, supra note 96.
98. Id.
99. See Milken's Settlement to Help Policyholders, J. oF Com., Mar. 11, 1992,
at 9A.
100. Schachner & McLeod, supra note 57, at 31 (quoting John Grillos, general
counsel for A.M. Best, that the public is free to attach as much weight as it wants to
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of these ratings and the reliance on them by consumer and profes-
sional financial analyst alike, however, precludes disregarding ratings
as insignificant opinions. 101
The rating agencies' access to inside corporate financial informa-
tion provides them with the means to make accurate and informed
decisions regarding the need to change a rating. Their failure to
downgrade First Executive Life is a prominent example of the fail-
ure of the rating agencies to downgrade ratings quickly enough. 102
B. Politics and Ratings
In addition to being criticized for being slow to change a rating,
rating agencies have also been accused of influencing and being in-
fluenced by politicians.
(i) Being Influenced
In 1988, Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis was the Demo-
cratic nominee for president of the United States. In March 1988,
the fiscal problems of Massachusetts were headline news. The state's
bonds fell as much as $40 per $1000 face value between January
and March. 0 3 Standard & Poor's, however, delayed its downgrading
almost until the end of the state's fiscal year on June 30, 1988.104
Standard & Poor's attempted to justify its decision to wait with the
excuse that they were waiting to see if the state would cure its fiscal
problems.' 5 In addition, despite worsening fiscal problems, the rat-
ing agencies did not downgrade the state's debt again until May
1989. Between May and July, the state's bond rating was down-
graded more times than any period in the ten preceding years.10 6 In
July, Standard & Poor's downgraded the state's general obligation
Best's judgment).
101. See, e.g., id. ("'What the hell does Best put out a rating for if not to advise
people and guide them in their actions .... You hold yourself out to be an expert in that
area and now you tell me I shouldn't have been foolish enough to believe you?' ") (quot-
ing an insurance company official who requested anonymity).
102. See, e.g., id. ("'With Executive Life, you can blame the agencies. They're
supposed to be insiders. They should know the company's financial structure better than
anyone. Even people on the outside knew Executive Life was overweight with junk bond
holdings' ") (quoting Kim McCarrel of the Wyatt Co.).
103. Frederic M. Biddle, Wall Street's Bond Busters: The Bay State Feels the
Rating Agencies' Wrath, BosToN GLOBE, July 30, 1989, at 63.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Richard Larkin, Standard & Poor's managing director).
106. Id.
bonds by two notches at once. This left Massachusetts with the low-
est bond rating of every state except Louisiana.0 7 The delay by
Standard & Poor's in downgrading Massachusetts debt has led some
to wonder whether its reasons were purely fiscal. The managing di-
rector of Standard & Poor's admitted that the rash of downgrades in
the summer of 1989 was not the result of any new, unexpected finan-
cial developments, but was rather "a culmination of things that have
been happening for the last nine months.' 0 8 Nine months before the
downgrades was autumn of 1988, when the presidential campaign
was in its critical stage. Were the raters pressured by political con-
siderations to delay their downgrades? 10 9
The downgrades in the summer of 1989 resulted in significantly
increased costs of raising debt for Massachusetts. Some estimated
that increasing the yield of bonds to compensate for their lower rat-
ing could cost the state $20 million a year."10 An alternative to pay-
ing higher yields on bonds is to obtain private insurance on a bond
issue. This effectively raises the bonds' rating to AAA, the highest
rating available. Massachusetts did this in June 1989 after a sched-
uled sale of $365 million of bonds was rated AA- by Standard &
Poor's, and A by Moody's."' Obtaining private insurance for the
bond issue raised its rating to AAA, and saved the state about $3.6
million in interest over the 20-year life of the bonds ." 2 However, the
state had to pay $1.6 million to obtain the insurance.
An earlier downgrade of the state's bond rating would not have
saved the state money, at least in the short run. Indeed, it would
have cost the state more because the state would have had to in-
crease the yield on future bonds in order to attract new bond pur-
chasers. However, it might have spurred the state legislature to more
quickly cure the state's fiscal problems. The state might have saved
money in the long run if stronger fiscal policy led to a quicker up-
grade of the state's bond rating.
Another example of critics charging a rating agency with being
influenced by a politician is New York's 1989 issuance of short-term
debt. In April 1989, Moody's met with Mario M. Cuomo, governor
of New York. New York was preparing to issue short-term debt to
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Zigas, supra note 9, at 108 ("Greenwich Partners' Sitzer notes that both
S&P and Moody's maintained the rating of Massachusetts too long during the course of
the 1988 Presidential elections, when the state's finances started to sour.").
110. Biddle, supra note 103, at 63. For an analysis of ratings as a determinant of
net interest cost for municipal bonds, see Much, supra note 31, at 43-50.
111. Biddle, supra note 103, at 63.
112. Id.
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finance the state's operations. Many people on Wall Street were ex-
pecting New York's rating to be downgraded at least one notch.113
Moody's, after a one-hour meeting with Governor Cuomo, however,
decided to maintain its rating. Standard & Poor's likewise did not
lower its rating.
1 14
Because New York had a huge deficit and was experiencing a
shortage of revenue, the rating agencies' failure to downgrade the
state's rating stunned most observers. It led Howard Sitzer, head of
municipal bond research at Greenwich Partners, to note that "[t]he
perception can't be avoided . . . that Moody's bent to political pres-
sure."115 Any suggestion of political influence is extremely significant
because of the stakes involved. A downgrade of New York State's
bond rating in January 1992 affected $14.2 billion of issues. 1 '
(ii) Influencing
In addition to receiving criticism for being influenced by politi-
cians, the rating agencies have been criticized for influencing politi-
cians. Rating agencies have tremendous power because increasingly
debt-laden state and city governments are dependent on a rating
from the agencies in order to raise money by issuing debt instru-
ments such as bonds. Rating agencies often make suggestions to
state legislators concerning ways to improve their rating. This can
cause the legislators to change their budget and has caused some
people to wonder whether the rating agencies have a disproportion-
ate influence in government.11
Some have even charged that the rating agencies use the possibil-
ity of a downgrade to threaten legislators. 1 8 Richard Larkin, man-
aging director of Standard & Poor's, admits that his company uses
the threat of a downgrade to influence state and city politicians:
113. Zigas, supra note 9, at 106.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See James C. Hyatt & Kevin Pritchett, New York State Debt Rating Cut by
Moody's Affects $14.2 billion of Issues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1992, at A2.
117. Adrienne Linsenmeyer, Quoth the Rater, Nevermore: How the Rating Agen-
cies are Telling Governors How to Spend Taxpayer Money, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 18, 1992,
at 24 ("Who elected the rating agencies to tell governors and mayors how to spend tax-
payer money?").
118. See, e.g., Charles V. Zehren, The New York Newsday Interview with
Stadnyk & Larkin: Looking at Some Real Brutal Facts, NEWSDAY, Feb. 26, 1992, at 79
(reporter's discussion with representatives of S&P's regarding politicians' influence on
the raters and vice versa).
"We will say, 'if this doesn't happen, then the rating is in jeop-
ardy.' "119 Standard & Poor's has even been referred to as a fourth
branch of the government. 120
The influence that the rating agencies have on state and local gov-
ernmental decisions is very real, and strengthens the argument for
some type of regulation. Rating agencies affect more than just the
cost of interest; they influence which social policies will be cut and
how the government will spend its money. A decision with such far-
reaching implications merits some type of oversight.
C. Unsolicited Ratings
Another practical problem regarding rating agencies is the pro-
mulgation by both financial and insurance-company rating agencies
of ratings which are not requested by the company being rated.
Moody's has been criticized for issuing unrequested ratings with re-
gard to bond and commercial paper issuances. Many believe that
these ratings, which are determined without access to the confiden-
tial corporate information normally available as part of the rating
process, 2' are just a means of increasing market share.
An example of Moody's unsolicited ratings is American Southwest
Financial Corporations' 1987 issuance of a collateralized mortgage
obligation (CMO). Just hours before the deal was finalized Moody's
issued an unsolicited rating. 22 Moody's rating was one notch lower
than the rating given by Standard & Poor's. Though Moody's justi-
fied its lower rating on perceived serious structural difficulties in the
issuance, others charged that Moody's wanted to send a message
that its approval was needed on any issuance of CMOs.'
23
Another example of Moody's unsolicited ratings involves the inter-
national debt market and a 1991 private placement issuance of $150
million of seven-year notes by the French steelmaker, Usinor Sacilor.
The company withdrew the offering after receiving an unwanted rat-
ing by Moody's. 24 Again, critics complained that the rating was just
a ploy by Moody's to increase market share.'-2
Leo O'Neill, president of Standard & Poor's, is critical of the un-
solicited ratings of Moody's. However, Standard & Poor's, while
criticizing Moody's for unsolicited ratings in the financial securities
119. Linsenmeyer, supra note 117, at 24.
120. Tom Buerkle, His Judgments Rate with Budgetmakers, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 29,
1990, at E13.
121. See supra note 65.
122. See Abby Schultz, Wake-up Call for the Ratings Agencies: Unwanted By
Issuers, Moody's Renegade Ratings Roll a Once-Sleepy Industry, INVESTMENT
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market, issues its own unsolicited ratings for insurance companies.
Standard & Poor's, along with Weiss Research, another insurance-
company rating agency, issues unsolicited ratings based solely on
quantitative analysis of financial data.126 Both rating agencies have
been criticized because such ratings are generally lower than a nor-
mal claims-paying-ability rating.12 Critics have charged Standard
& Poor's with issuing these lower ratings 2 " in order to extort insur-
ance companies into requesting a more costly claims-paying-ability
rating.' 29 A claims-paying-ability rating costs between $22,000 and
$28,000.13° The idea behind the critics' allegations is that Standard
& Poor's first issues its qualified solvency rating, which is lower (or
at least appears so because a different scale is used) than its normal
rating, and which has not been requested by the company being
rated. Then Standard & Poor's publishes the rating, forcing the
rated company to purchase the claims-paying-ability rating in order
to eliminate the perception that the company has a lower rating.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
has investigated claims that Standard & Poor's uses these ratings to
coerce insurers into buying the more expensive claims-paying-ability
rating.' 3' However, it has not issued any opinion on Standard &
126. These ratings are known as "qualified solvency ratings." See Insurance Com-
pany Rating Agencies: A Description of Their Methods and Procedures; Condensation
of Report Prepared by National Association of Insurance Commissioners, BEST'S RE-
VIEW, LIFE/HEALTH INS. EDITION, Mar. 1992, at 10, 107, 109-10 [hereinafter NAIC
Report]. However, note that Weiss issues exclusively objective ratings, and never consults
with or receives a fee from the insurance company. Standard & Poor's, on the other
hand, issues both qualified solvency, ratings and claims-paying-ability ratings.
127. Id. at 10.
128. Standard & Poor's uses a different scale for its qualified solvency ratings. The
highest rating S&P's gives in a qualified solvency rating is BBBq, while its highest
claims-paying-ability rating is AAA. Both ratings signify the same high level of financial
strength. Thus, even if the rating S&P's issues as a qualified solvency rating is not actu-
ally lower than what its claims-paying-ability rating would be, consumers are likely to be
confused by the qualified solvency rating and think it is lower. See Lisa S. Howard,
Examine Rating Agencies, Regulator, Insurers Suggest, NAT'L UNDERWRITER. PROP. &
CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Sept. 9, 1991, at 1, 34 (consumers are
confused when they see an AAA next to a BBBq, even though both ratings signify top
quality); Lisa S. Howard, Why Not Let the Market Rate the Rating Companies?, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Sept. 30, 1991,
at 70 (solvency ratings are clearly misleading). See also Dauer, supra note 28, at S25
(confusion is being exacerbated by the growing number of rating agencies and suggests a
uniform rating system be implemented).
129. NAIC Report, supra note 126, at 105.
130. Id.
131. See Cynthia Crosson, NAIC Eyes 'Coercion'By Rating Firm, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Dec. 23, 1991, at 10.
Poor's practice of issuing these unsolicited ratings. The NAIC re-
port1"2 undertook an examination of the rating practices of five in-
surance-company rating agencies. Unfortunately, the report did not
provide any more information than is generally available to the pub-
lic. Additionally, it did not attempt to evaluate the validity of the
rating agencies' rating methods, nor did it attempt to assess the ac-
curacy of the ratings by comparing ratings with actual
performance.
13 3
The issuance of unsolicited ratings is important because of their
effect on the market. If these ratings merely represent additional in-
formation on the insurers, then they are to be welcomed. However,
if, as suggested, they lead to consumer confusion and force insurance
companies to buy expensive claims-paying-ability ratings in an effort
to dispel consumer confusion, then some solution such as regulation
may be warranted. The problem of unsolicited ratings is much
greater with respect to Standard & Poor's than with Weiss Re-
search. Because Weiss' 34 only issues one type of rating, based on
purely objective financial data, danger of investor confusion is mini-
mal. Investors who rely on Weiss' rating know that the rating is
based solely on objective data, and also know that it is usually lower
than a rating by one of the other rating agencies. 135 The risk of in-
vestor confusion, however, is much greater with respect to Standard
& Poor's because of the firm's use of two types of ratings. Consum-
ers are more likely to be confused by Standard & Poor's qualified
solvency ratings, which use only objective data, and which use a dif-
ferent scale than the normal rating. This is true even if publication
of the qualified solvency ratings is accompanied by a sufficient expla-
nation of their nature.136 Standard & Poor's qualified solvency rat-
ings ought to use the same scale as their claims-paying-ability
ratings.
D. Inaccuracy and Lack of Disclosure
Finally, the rating agencies have been criticized for being inaccu-
rate and for failing to provide adequate disclosure of important fi-
nancial information to investors who rely on the ratings. Some have
132. Supra note 126.
133. NAIC Report, supra note 126, at 110.
134. For a description of Weiss' rating methods, see NAIC report, supra note 126,
at 109-10.
135. See, e.g., Eric N. Berg, The Bad Boy of Insurance Ratings, N. Y. TINIEs,
Jan. 5, 1992, at F1 (Weiss known for low ratings).
136. The publication of these ratings is currently accompanied by such an explana-
tion. Yet, consumers are still confused by the ratings. See Howard, supra note 128, at 34
(the very nature of the qualified solvency ratings creates consumer confusion).
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charged that the number of rating agencies is too small to be com-
petitive, and thus results in inadequate disclosure to investors.
13 7
Others have charged the rating agencies with being inaccurate. Sev-
eral studies have concluded that rating agencies are highly inaccu-
rate in reporting terms of the bond covenant." 8 One study by
Professors Asquith and Wizman compared information in Moody's
Industrial Manual with the bond's actual prospectus and found that
Moody's was incorrect twenty-one percent of the time.13 9 The study
found that important provisions of the bond indenture, such as debt-
restrictive covenants and net worth covenants, were often omitted or
misstated. Such omission or misstatement can cause serious
problems that result in litigation. 40
Another study noted that the rating agencies were slow to down-
grade companies that made announcements of leveraged buyouts. 4
It found that Standard & Poor's changed its rating an average of
five months after such an announcement.'42 Additionally, one study
found that there was a six to seven month lag between the rating
change by one major rating agency and a subsequent change by the
other major rating agency.'4 3 Finally, studies have found that, absent
the recent refinements to the ratings scale,' Moody's and Standard
137. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 817 (1985). See
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Dis-
closure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 745-46 (1984) (rating agencies do not correct for
inadequate market efficiency in the municipal bond industry, resulting in lack of full
disclosure to investors).
138. The bond covenant or indenture is the legal agreement between the company
issuing the bond and a trustee representing bondholders who will eventually buy the
bonds. It is a detailed and complicated document, containing all the terms relating to the
bonds being issued. See BELKAOUI, supra note 2, at 4.
139. Paul Asquith & Thierry Wizman, Event Risk, Wealth Redistribution, and
the Return to Existing Bondholders in Corporate Buyouts 10-11 (1990).
140. For cases in which the bond rating agencies were sued due to such mistakes,
see Durning v. First Boston Corp., 627 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (rating agency
omitted fact that bonds were redeemable); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard &
Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989);
First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), affid, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989) (rating agency misstated bond provisions).
141. Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts 12
(June 1993 rev. ed.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
142. Id.
143. Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 29, at 23-49 (citing E. Altman et al., The
Application of Statistical Classification Methods to Bond Quality Ratings, in APPLICA-
TION OF CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES IN BUSINESS, BANKING AND FINANCE (JAI Press
1981)).
144. For example, absent the pluses or minuses associated with a letter rating (e.g.
"A+" vs. "A").
& Poor's issue different ratings on approximately ten to fifteen per-
cent of new bond issues. 145 Furthermore, again disregarding refine-
ments in the rating scale, rating agencies issue different ratings on
about half of outstanding bonds.146
On the other hand, many claim that the ratings are accurate.
They cite studies which measure accuracy by the rate of default, and
indicate that the default rate of highly rated debt is very low.1 47 One
possible retort to these findings is that measuring accuracy by rate of
default is an imperfect measure of the accuracy and usefulness of
ratings. While it is true that consumers purchase highly rated debt
to avoid the risk of default, they also seek to avoid drastic downgrad-
ing of such debt. One of the main reasons consumers purchase
highly rated debt is because they are risk-averse. Highly rated debt
usually pays lower interest than debt with a lower rating, and con-
sumers are willing to accept this lower rate of interest in exchange
for their expectation, 14 8 induced by the high rating, that the debt is
not risky.149 Thus, most consumers would probably be very unhappy
if the "AAA" rating of their bond was dropped to a "C". Yet, be-
cause such a downgrading of the bond's rating would not place the
bond in default, information regarding such a significant downgrade
would not be included in a study of the default rate of bonds.
Another reason that measuring the accuracy of ratings by the per-
cent of default of rated debt may be an inadequate indication of the
integrity of ratings is that a considerable amount of debt is not rated
at all. Many issuers of debt do not seek a rating because of the cost,
or because their credit represents higher risk that they prefer not to
have exposed to the public market. Issuers of investment quality
bonds1 50 may actively seek ratings, while issuers of lower quality
bonds may be pressured not to be rated. Moreover, the fact that
much debt is unrated1 51 is important in that information regarding
the debt's credit risk is not being conveyed to consumers. Because
the majority of all default experience since the Great Depression has
been in unrated bonds, those bonds that are most in need of credit
145. Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 29, at 23-49.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 23-17 (citing E. Altman & S. Nammacher, High Yield Fixed-Income
Default Experience, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., Fixed Income Division (1985) (only
16 of 88 firms that defaulted between Jan. 1970 and Dec. 1984 were rated higher than
"B"). See also Husisian, supra note 28, at 441.
148. Consumers, justifiably or not, rely heavily on a high rating. See Much, supra
note 31, at 69 (quoting one consumer who likened an "AAA" rating to a stamp of ap-
proval from God).
149. See supra note 2.
150. An investment-grade rating means one of the four highest ratings. See
BELKAOUI, supra note 2.
151. See, e.g., Much, supra note 31, at 39-43 (many municipal bonds are not
rated).
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review and publicity are frequently those that do not receive it.
52
The rating agencies are currently addressing this problem by issuing
unsolicited ratings. However, as has been shown, a question exists as
to whether unsolicited ratings provide meaningful information or
merely confuse and mislead consumers.6 3
II. RATINGS AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
A. Use of Ratings to Exclude Structured Financings From the
Definition of Investment Company
The Securities and Exchange Commission relies upon rating agen-
cies in many ways to exempt certain transactions from the disclosure
requirements of federal regulations. For example, the SEC relies
heavily upon rating agencies in new Rule 3a-7, a recent amendment
to the 1940 Investment Advisers Act. 54 Rule 3a-7 excludes asset-
backed securities, or structured financings, from the definition of an
investment company under the Act. Structured financings are a fi-
nancial technique in which assets, such as home mortgages, credit
card receivables, and airplane and computer leases, are pooled.
Then, securities are issued based on the strength of the asset pool.
SEC Commissioner Richard Breeden has described the development
of structured financing as one of the most far-reaching developments
in United States financial markets in the last twenty years. 15 5
Significantly, assets that are eligible to back the structured financ-
ings are those rated, at the time of initial sale, in one of the four
highest categories by at least one nationally recognized statistical
rating organization.'56 Rule 3a-7, as originally proposed, would have
152. Id. at 112.
Because the recent default experience has been exclusively in unrated bonds,
the quality of unrated credit becomes immediately suspect. As a class, unrated
bonds represent an unfortunate commingling of those who cannot afford (or
choose not to purchase) a rating, those who avoid ratings, and those to whom
ratings are not given for a variety of reasons. The existence of this complex of
unrated bonds is one of the major shortcomings of the present credit rating
system.
Id.
153. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1993). See Exclusion From the Definition of Invest-
ment Company for Structured Financings, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (No. 229, Nov. 27,
1992).
155. See SEC Approves New Exemption for Structured Financings from '40 Act,
24 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1799 (1992) (Commissioner Breeden noting that around half of
all the mortgages in America are involved in structured financings).
156. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a)(2) (1993).
limited eligible securities to those rated in one of the top two catego-
ries by a NRSRO. 15 7 This aspect of the amendment had been criti-
cized by the Investment Company Institute (ICI). The ICI argued
that the amendment relies too heavily on unregulated rating agencies
to determine what type of securities may be offered to .the public.1"8
B. Ratings and Abbreviated Disclosure Requirements
In general, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires cor-
porations wanting to issue new securities to file a registration state-
ment that describes detailed financial information about the
corporation and the' security being offered. In 1982, the SEC intro-
duced a new disclosure policy that allows certain companies to file
substantially shorter registration statements than had been previ-
ously required.'59 Companies can use one of the new short registra-
tion forms if they are either widely followed by market analysts or if
they possess an investment-grade rating for their debt or nonconvert-
ible preferred stock. 160 Thus, regardless of whether the company can
satisfy the requirement of being widely followed by security analysts,
it can use Form S-3 as long as its debt is rated investment-grade by
a rating agency. 16 ' The SEC is relying on the rating agencies to in-
vestigate and assess the financial condition of the issuer.
157. See SEC Proposes Excluding Structured Financings from '40 Act, 24 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. 797 (1992) (noting that SEC Commissioners Mary Schapiro and Rich-
ard Roberts expressed concern about the proposed amendment's heavy reliance on unreg-
ulated rating agencies).
158. See ICI Blasts Structured Financing Draft, While Others Favor SECs Rule
Proposal, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1414, 1415 (1992).
159. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN. THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.3, at
96-100 (2d ed. West 1990). The new disclosure system was promulgated under the pre-
mise that although information specific to the security being issued should always be
disclosed in conjunction with the issuance, more general information about the registrant
need not be disclosed if the information is already publicly available. The new integrated
disclosure system established a three-tiered system of registration forms based on the
registrant's reporting history and market following. Form S-1 is the traditional "long"
form and requires complete registrant and transaction information to be provided in the
prospectus. Id. § 3.3, at 98. Form S-2 requires less disclosure, and may be used by all
registrants who have reported for three or more years under the Securities Act of 1933.
Id. Form S-3 requires the least amount of disclosure. No information pertaining to the
registrant need be included in the prospectus unless the company has experienced a ma-
terial change. Only information specific to the security being registered need be dis-
closed. Id. To qualify to use Form S-3, the registrant must meet two requirements. First,
the registrant must meet the three-year reporting requirement of Form S-2. Second, the
registrant must meet a "market following" test under which it must either (1) have a
minimum of $150 million voting stock held by nonaffiliates (the "float"), or (2) have
$100 million float and an annual trading volume of at least three million shares. Id.
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1993).
161. The SEC explicitly relied on the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH)
in adopting both its abbreviated disclosure system and Rule 415 (the shelf registration
process). See, e.g., Sec. Act Re]. 6499, 29 SEC. DOCK. 138, 141 (1983). Three forms of
the ECMH exist. The weak form tests whether historical price data are fully reflected in
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The SEC's reliance on ratings to justify abbreviated disclosure in
registration statements is significant because it assumes the accuracy
and reliability of ratings. If such ratings are not accurate, consumers
face significant risks. One of the most important risks is that the
ratings do not disclose adequate information. Some have charged
that because the number of rating agencies is small, the market for
ratings is not sufficiently competitive, resulting in a lack of full dis-
closure." 2 Additionally, investors who purchase securities from a
company that may use Form S-3 desire some information that will
not be reflected by a rating.'63 These dangers are accentuated by
the price of a security. The semi-strong form tests whether all publicly available informa-
tion is reflected in the price. The third form, the strong form, tests whether all informa-
tion, including private information, is fully reflected in the price. See Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970). Empirical studies have cast doubt on the legitimacy of the strong form. See 1
LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 184 n.41 (3rd ed. 1989). See
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanics of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). The ECMH is not universally accepted and has been
criticized as an unproven and unreliable theory. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's reasoning that an inves-
tor who relies on the integrity of a stock's price should be entitled to a presumption of
reliance in a cause of action under § lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Whatever the merits of the ECMH, realizing that the SEC is increasingly relying on it
and on ratings to justify restricting the amount of information that must be disclosed in
conjunction with securities transactions is important. For an analysis of the validity of
this hypothesis as a justification for the SEC's new registration rules, see Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 817. See also Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsi-
dies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration" An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L.
REV. 135 (1984); Marvin G. Pickholz & Edward B. Horahan III, The SEC's Version of
the Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943 (1982).
162. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 817. Adequate disclosure of infor-
mation is key to the federal securities system. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483
(1981) ("[D]isclosure... is crucial to the way in which the federal securities laws func-
tion .... [T]he federal securites laws are intended to put investors into a position from
which they can help themselves by relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to
make.") (Randall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the fraud-on-the-market theory in an action
under § lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because to do so would defeat the
disclosure requirements of the Act).
163. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 162 (noting that ratings only provide in-
formation regarding the risk of default, and that information relevant to equity is also
very important to the investor in debt securities).
Much of the recent legal commentary regarding bonds has focused on bondholder
rights. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Faith Stevelman, Duties to Bondholders in Recapi-
talizations and Restructurings, 23 INST. ON SEC. REG. 277 (1991); Dale B. Tauke,
Should Bonds Have More Fun, 1989 COLUm. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1989); Morey W. McDan-
iel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. LAW 205 (1988); Albert H. Barkey, The
Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to
Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47 (1986); Morey W. Mc-
Daniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986).
recent SEC amendments to the Form S-3 registration process. On
October 21, 1992, the SEC approved amendments to the shelf regis-
tration process 64 which make the Form S-3 registration process
available to an additional 450 companies.165 One of the most signifi-
cant amendments is that eligible users of Form S-3 now need only
file financial statements for the preceding twelve months, rather than
the previously required thirty-six months. 166
The SEC's reliance on the rating agencies in allowing companies
to use the Form S-3 registration statement poses two important dan-
gers. First, investors purchasing securities registered under Form S-3
may not be receiving sufficient information regarding events which
may significantly threaten the security of their investment. Further-
more, investors may actually be receiving inaccurate information by
relying on the ratings if such ratings inaccurately state the provisions
of a bond indenture.
16 7
These commentators have called attention to the fact that recent events such as lever-
aged buyouts and mergers have resulted in an expropriation of wealth from bondholders
to stockholders. However, current remedies for bondholders have been limited. Thus,
when company directors take actions which result in a transfer of wealth from bondhold-
ers to stockholders, the bondholders usually cannot recover unless the company actually
defaults. This is a very inadequate remedy, and highlights the need for bondholders to
receive accurate and reliable information regarding company actions that may increase
the company's risk of default.
The rating agencies have responded, to a certain extent, to events such as leveraged
buyouts and mergers (which, because they are frequently financed by risky debt, often
increase the risk of default on previously issued bonds). For example, in July 1989, Stan-
dard & Poor's began to rate publicly held bonds by event risk. See Kenneth N. Gilpin,
S&P to Rate Protection on Takeovers, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1989, at 31. In January
1990, Standard & Poor's announced that it would rate private placements by covenant
protection. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bondholder Puzzle, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 22, 1990, at
7. However, the fact that it took Standard & Poor's almost five years from the time that
event risk became a major threat to bondholders to implement such a system demon-
strates that the market is not serving as an efficient check on the services provided by the
rating agencies.
164. Shelf registration refers to the ability of an issuer to offer and sell securities
at any time within two years after the effective date of the registration statement. 17
C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(3) (1992). Such subsequent "shelf" offerings must meet four re-
quirements: the offering must be through the facility of a national exchange; the securi-
ties must be sold through one or more underwriters named in the prospectus; the
securities must meet the requirements of Form S-3 (i.e. the securities must be widely
followed by financial analysts); and the amount of registered securities, when voting
stock, must not exceed 10 percent of the nonaffiliate float ("float" refers to the amount of
stock outstanding and available for trading after reduction of large blocks of stock not
likely to enter the market). See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 161, at 359-60. See also
Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 135-43 (2d ed. 1988) (detail-
ing history of Rule 415).
165. See SEC Approves Rule Changes on QIBS, Shelf Registration, 24 SEc. REG.
& L. REP. 1631 (1992).
166. Id. Additional amendments include allowing the offering of investment-grade
asset backed financings on the S-3 Form and reduction of the minimum public float test
for noninvestment-grade primary offerings from $150 million to $75 million. Id.
167. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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These dangers are accentuated by Rule 415,168 which allows a cor-
poration that has filed a registration statement with the SEC to
quickly issue securities for up to two years after the filing of the
initial registration statement. If the corporation is eligible to use
Form S-3 as its registration statement, it can issue its securities
within forty-eight hours of the time it files the form. The company
can issue its securities even if fundamental corporate changes have
occurred subsequent to the filing of the registration statement.169
The only requirement that the corporation must satisfy is the filing
of periodic reports.170 Thus, a real risk exists that a corporation
could issue new securities based on an old rating that does not reflect
significant new developments.
C. Use of Ratings to Qualify Mutual Funds for Use of
Amortized Cost Method of Asset Valuation
Another example of the SEC's reliance on ratings is Rule 2a-7 of
the 1940 Investment Company Act. 17 ' Rule 2a-7, an exemptive rule
widely used by money market funds to value assets, allows the amor-
tized cost of the securities in mutual fund portfolios to be used to
establish the net agset value of fund shares.172 The rule's amortized
cost method is less costly and more effective than having to compute
the value of the mutual fund portfolios on a daily market basis. 173 To
qualify for use of the amortized cost method, a short-term money
market fund must be rated in one of the two highest categories by
two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. 4 If a se-
curity is downgraded to a rating that is not one of the top two i'at-
ings, the mutual fund is required to reassess the credit risk of the
168. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1992).
169. However, these changes must be disclosed as post-effective amendments to
the S-3 registration statement. The reporting of these changes is required by the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1988). The Exchange Act requires that
companies issuing securities on a national securities exchange file a registration state-
ment for the security. Id. § 78(l)(a). Additionally, the Act requires all issuers of regis-
tered securities to file such additional current information as is needed to keep reasonably
current all statements filed pursuant to section 12 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(a)
(1988).
170. Rule 415, in combination with Regulation S-K, requires a shelf registrant to
provide the SEC with any information, such as a new debt issue, that amounts to a
fundamental change in the information provided in the registration statement.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1992).
172. See SEC Issues Release on Amendments Affecting Money Market Funds'
Assets, 23 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 322, 322 (1991).
173. Id.
174. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(5)(i) (1992). In a proposed amendment to Rule 2a-
security.1 5 Thus, the SEC is relying on the rating agencies to both
establish which securities are eligible for Rule 2a-7 and to determine
when the credit risk of mutual fund portfolio securities should be re-
evaluated. This is especially noteworthy because mutual fund securi-
ties are short-term securities. Therefore, if rating agencies are slow
to downgrade a rating, the credit risk of securities held by mutual
funds may not receive timely re-evaluation.
D. Use of Ratings to Exempt Qualified Institutional Buyers
From the Disclosure Requirements of the 1933 Securities Act
The SEC also relies on ratings to justify reduced disclosure re-
quirements under Rule 144A of the 1933 Securities Act. 178 Rule
144A exempts from the registration requirements of the 1933 Secur-
ities Act certain reoffers and resales of securities of foreign and do-
mestic issuers. The exempted transactions involve private
transactions in which the purchaser is a "qualified institutional
buyer" (QIB). 17 The presumption is that these private transactions
do not pose the same danger as a public offering, and that qualified
institutional buyers are parties able to fend for themselves in the
marketplace. 178 A major obstacle, however, to effective implementa-
tion of Rule 144A is determining who is a QIB. To facilitate this
determination, the SEC has declared that sellers may rely on a list
of QIBs published by Standard & Poor's. 79 Thus, the SEC is rely-
ing on a rating agency to qualify a purchaser to engage in a transac-
tion exempted from traditional disclosure requirements.
7, the SEC in April 1991 recommended that the mutual fund security should only have
to be rated in one of the highest two categories by one rating agency. See SEC Would
Exempt Tax-Exempt Funds from Need to Approve Unrated Purchases, 23 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. 527, 527 (1991) (stating as a reason for the proposed amendment the burden of
requiring a rating by two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NR-
SROs), because many securities are rated by only one NRSRO).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(5)(i) (1992).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1992). Rule 144A was adopted by the SEC on April
30, 1990. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Hold-
ing Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933
(1990).
177. Any entity that owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million
in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity may constitute a qualified
institutional buyer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(i) (1992). See also J. WILLIAM HICKS, 7B
EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 10A.03[3] (1993).
178. See Hicks, supra note 177, § 10A.01[1].
179. See Standard & Poor's Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,021, at 78,893 (July 8, 1991) (SEC
grants Standard & Poor's request that a seller may rely on list of QIBs published by
S&P's in its Corporation Records). See also Sellers May Rely on S&P List for Rule
144A Purposes, Staff Confirms, 23 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1095 (1991).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Comment has sought to examine the current status and role
of rating agencies and ratings in the financial securities and insur-
ance markets. This examination has revealed that rating agencies
are often slow in changing ratings, that consumers are confused due
to lack of uniform standards, and that unsolicited ratings are being
published. Because a rating is often the main factor upon which both
institutional and private investors rely when making an investment
decision, and because the Securities and Exchange Commission in-
creasingly relies on ratings to justify exempting issuers from disclo-
sure requirements in connection with securities transactions,
problems related to ratings agencies merit serious consideration.
One possible solution to the problems currently affecting the mar-
ket for ratings is to allow a personal cause of action against the rat-
ing agencies and change the standard of care applicable to rating
agencies from recklessness to negligence. 8 ' Although conducting a
full examination of this option is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment,' 8' for reasons briefly mentioned below, this possible remedy
should be rejected.
First, changing the standard of care that rating agencies must ex-
ercise from recklessness to negligence might not lead to an increased
level of care exercised by the rating agencies. Instead, rating agen-
cies might refuse to rate more risky debt.' 2 Thus, an increased stan-
dard of care might not result in improved diligence in the rating
process utilized by the rating agencies.
A second reason why heightening the standard of care should be
rejected is that because the threat of expanded liability may lead to
the refusal of rating agencies to rate risky debt, less information may
180. Currently, the rating agencies, as members of the media, are not held liable
unless they act recklessly. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's
Corp., 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989); Pittman V. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921
(E.D. La. 1987), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
181. For a more detailed analysis, see Husisian, supra note 28, at 430-46 (re-
jecting the idea of changing the standard of care from recklessness to negligence).
182. The rating agencies' potential refusal to rate risky debt due to fear of in-
creased liability may be explainable in terms of their imperfect ability to transfer the
cost of increased potential liability to the company being rated. Rating agencies are paid
by the company whose debt is rated. However, this rating is disseminated to many inves-
tors who obtain a benefit from the rating because the rating aids their investment deci-
sion. The rating agency, though, may not be able to increase the cost of a rating
sufficiently to fully compensate itself for the benefit conferred upon these "free-rider"
third-party investors. But, assuming they can, the price of a rating might be placed
outside the reach of many companies. Thus, rating agencies may simply choose not to
rate risky debt.
be provided to investors. As previously mentioned, companies issuing
risky debt frequently choose not to have the debt rated.18 3 If chang-
ing the standard of care of rating agencies leads to a decreased will-
ingness of rating agencies to rate the risky debt of companies that do
desire a rating, then the result may be decreased protection of inves-
tors due to decreased information."" The debt of companies that
perhaps most needs to be rated - because the company issuing the
debt is young or small or risky in its business strategy - may not
receive a rating.
A second solution to the present problems with ratings is limited
regulation. Current problems indicate that competition is not serving
as a sufficient means for regulating the market for ratings. Competi-
tion provides no incentive for the rating agencies to downgrade a
rating in a timely manner, nor has it served to discourage unsolicited
ratings. Regulation of the entire industry, however, is undesirable.
Too much regulation inhibits economic growth by increasing costs
and making capital harder to raise. 8 ' Given the fact, though, that
ratings are extensively relied upon by the SEC to reduce regulatory
requirements, rating agencies must receive at least minimal
oversight. 186
183. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
184. Compare the analogous situation of the liability of accountants to third-party
creditors for negligent audits. Traditionally, accountants were only liable for negligent
conduct towards a party with whom they were in contractual privity. Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). Some courts, stressing goals of deterrence and risk-
spreading, have held accountants liable under a negligence standard to third parties
whose reliance on the accountant's audit was foreseeable. Touche Ross & Co. v. Com-
mercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986); Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335
N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
However, the result of this expanded liability was different from that intended. Ac-
countants, rather than improving the overall level of care, responded by limiting their
audits to "safe" companies. See John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits
of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1967 (1988).
185. In a survey of 653 corporate executives during the second half of 1991, gov-
ernment regulation was identified as the top concern for more than 50% of all chief
executive officers. Corporate Executives Surveyed Say Government Regulations Top
Concern, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 207, 208 (Feb. 14, 1992). In his State of the Union
address Jan. 28, 1992, President Bush requested a 90-day moratorium on new govern-
ment regulations in an effort to reduce burdens on businesses. See Bush Directs Regula-
tory Agencies to Review Pending Rules to Help Economy, 24 SEC. REG. & L REP. 102,
102 (1992). Some commentators even saw Mr. Bush's moratorium as a potential chance
to challenge the constitutionality of all independent regulatory agencies. See L. Gordon
Crovitz, Rule of Law: Which Boss Should a Poor Regulator Believe?, WALL ST. J., Feb.
12, 1992, at A21 (speculating that if one of the agencies such as the EPA or SEC re-
fused to comply with the moratorium, the Justice Department could challenge the consti-
tutionality of the agency).
186. See Vicky Stamas, Only a Minority Backs Creating More Rules as Market
Debates Rating Agency Role, BOND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1992, at 1 (Craig Tyle, V.P. of the
Investment Company Institute, argues that if federal securities laws are radically
changed to make rating agencies quasi-regulatory bodies, then greater oversight of rating
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What is needed is limited regulation directed at the few serious
problems afflicting rating agency activity. The rating agencies should
continue to make their own decisions, with a regulatory agency's role
limited to suggesting re-evaluation of a rating and imposing sanc-
tions when appropriate. Because of the differences in the financial
securities marketplace and insurance industry, discussion of the pro-
posed regulation will be separated into two subparts: subpart A:
Regulation of Financial Security Ratings; subpart B: Regulation of
Insurance Company Ratings.
A. Regulation of Ratings of Financial Securities
Because a rating of a financial security accompanies issuance of
the security, these ratings could be regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or by a commission set up by the SEC. The
SEC should be given explicit statutory authority to (1) establish
standards for the designation of nationally- recognized statistical rat-
ing organizations and require all NRSROs to register with the SEC;
and (2) promulgate rules governing NRSROs.
(i) Establishing Standards for Designation of NRSROs
Currently, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation governs the
designation of NRSROs through the issuance of no-action letters. If
a rating agency wishes to be designated a NRSRO, it sends a letter
to the SEC requesting that the SEC recommend no regulatory en-
forcement action against the rating agency if it is designated a NR-
SRO.1 17 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, however, does
not set standards for qualifying a rating agency as a NRSRO.' 88
Moreover, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation has not devel-
oped formal standards for such designation, relying instead primarily
on market acceptance of rating agencies in designating NRSROs.1 19
agencies is warranted).
187. For an example of such a letter, see IBCA Limited, SEC No-Action Letter,
[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,624, at 77,824 (Oct. 11,
1990); see also U.K. Firm May Be Used as Rating Agency for Compliance With Net
Capital Rule, 22 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1560 (1990).
188. See U.K. Firm May Be Used as Rating Agency for Compliance With Net
Capital Rule, supra note 187.
189. In deciding whether to designate a rating agency a NRSRO, the Division of
Market Regulation has stated that the most important criterion is whether the agency's
ratings are nationally recognized by preeminent users of rating services as credible and
reliable. See Colorado Concern Not Qualified to be Designated NRSRO, Staff Advises,
23 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 542, 542 (1991). The Division of Market Regulation has stated
However, given the SEC's heavy reliance on NRSROs, it should es-
tablish minimum requirements for the designation of such agencies,
rather than predominantly relying on market acceptance. The desig-
nation of NRSRO gives to a rating agency powerful marketabil-
ity.190 A corporation will pay more for a rating from a NRSRO
because such a rating is capable of exempting the corporation from
costly and tedious compliance with federal disclosure requirements.
Legislation should be passed which would give the SEC explicit au-
thority to establish minimum requirements for such designation.
Furthermore, all NRSROs should be required to register with the
SEC. SEC Commissioners Mary Schapiro and Richard Roberts
have advocated such a requirement.' 9' Additionally, Representative
John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee, supports regulation of rating agencies and has indicated his
desire to draft such legislation. 192 Currently, all NRSROs must reg-
ister with the SEC as investment advisers under the 1940 Investment
Advisers Act. Given the questionable legality of this requirement, 1 3
though, legislation which would give the SEC explicit power to re-
quire such registration is desirable. Registration of NRSROs would
enable the SEC to monitor the rating agencies and ensure that their
practices result in accurate and reliable ratings. At a minimum, all
NRSROs should be compelled to disclose to the SEC their rating
that it also relies on other factors such as the agency's financial resources, its staffing, its
reputation for integrity in the marketplace, its rating procedures, and its compliance with
procedures designed to prevent misuse of nonpublic information. Id. at 542-43. In failing
to recognize Dealer and Bondholder Services, Inc. (DBS) as a NRSRO, the Division of
Market Regulation relied heavily on the fact that DBS was small and not widely ac-
cepted in the marketplace. Id. at 543. Cf. Aaron Pressman, Dingell May Draft New
Law Regulating Rating Agencies, INVESTMENT DEALERS' Did, May 11, 1992, at 5 (not-
ing that SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts has suggested four criteria that an agency
should meet to be considered a NRSRO: national recognition by the marketplace as
being credible and reliable; a thorough, credible, and comprehensive rating methodology;
unbiased analysts free from outside pressures; and timely and useful ratings).
190. Additionally, the purchaser of a rating from a NRSRO gains marketability.
Purchasers of ratings often use the rating in their advertising. See, e.g., the advertise-
ment of Municipal Bond Investors Assurance Corporation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1993, at
A13 ("Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's give their highest rating, Triple-A, to every
bond we cover.").
191. Roberts, Schapiro Seek Legislation Giving SEC Power Over Rating Agen-
cies, supra note 25, at 1269 (noting that rating agencies have become an integral part of
the federal regulatory scheme); Debt Rating Agencies Should Be Subject to More SEC
Regulation, Roberts Asserts, 24 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 485, 485-86 (1992). However,
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden opposes any regulation of rating agencies. See Debt
Rating Agencies: Breeden Sees No Need For Legislation Giving SEC Power Over Rating
Agencies, 24 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1299, 1299 (1992) (stating his opinion that rating
agencies are already subject to strong market discipline).
192. SEC: Dingell Asks SEC to Help Draft Rating Agencies Regulation Bill, 24
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 684, 684-85 (1992); see also SEC Dingell Seeks Views on Bank
Tying, Rating Agencies, Amex Listing Procedures, 24 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1089, 1089
(1992).
193. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
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methodology and guidelines for review of ratings.
(ii) Promulgation of Rules Governing NRSROs: The
Writ of Review
Legislation concerning rating agencies should grant to the SEC
authority to pass rules governing the conduct of rating agencies.
These rules should be primarily advisory. For example, the SEC
could pass a rule enabling it to issue a "Writ of Review." If the
Commission believes that a rating agency is unduly delaying chang-
ing a rating, it would issue a Writ of Review to the rating agency,
suggesting that the rating agency re-evaluate the rating. The rating
agency would be free to disregard the writ. However, failure to re-
evaluate would raise a presumption of negligence. Complying with
the writ would raise a presumption of due care.
Anyone would be permitted to petition the commission to issue a
writ, but the commission would possess absolute discretion to issue or
not issue the writ. For example, a corporation could petition the
commission to issue a writ if it believed that its rating should be
upgraded. 94 Or, an individual investor or consumer group could pe-
tition the commission to issue a writ if they suspected a downgrade
was necessary. Finally, in many instances the SEC might issue a
writ based on its access and review of a security issuer's information.
For example, consider the SEC's enforcement action against Presi-
dential Life Corporation. 95 The SEC sanctioned Presidential Life
for its 1989 improper accounting of the value of junk bonds and
other securities. The junk bonds alone had declined in market value
by about $20.7 million. 9 ' The result was that Presidential Life's
pre-tax income for 1989 was overstated by about thirty-seven per-
cent. In a case such as this, the SEC could, along with bringing en-
forcement action as it did, issue a Writ of Review to the rating
agency. Here, it was not necessary because the bonds were rated
194. Although complaints that a rating agency has improperly withheld a rating
increase are less frequent than complaints of slowness in downgrading a rating, they do
exist. For an example of such a complaint with respect to state bonds, see Stan Hinden,
Credit Raters Questioned by States; Treasurers Meet Firms' Analysts, WASH. POST,
July 27, 1991, at F1 (state treasurers questioned whether rating agencies' failure to up-
grade was based on weak economic climate of region, rather than conditions in their
particular state). See also Susan Pulliam, A.M. Best, Insurer-Rating Firm, Refines Its
System Amid Criticism It Acted Late, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1992, at B5 (many insur-
ance companies have complained of unnecessary downgrades).
195. See Insurance Company Charged by SEC for Junk Bond Accounting Prac-
tices, 24 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1537, 1537 (1992).
196. Id.
noninvestment grade by Moody's. Yet, these events do suggest the
type of situation in which the SEC could issue a Writ of Review if
the rating had not been changed.
Although this type of situation may seem farfetched, it is exactly
what happened with First Executive Life. Despite the fact that Cali-
fornia insurance regulators forced First Executive Life to reduce its
reported portfolio value, due largely to drastic decreases in the value
of its huge junk bond holdings, the rating agencies did not subse-
quently downgrade First Executive Life's rating.
(iii) Standard of Review and Sanctions
If the rating agency complies with the writ by reviewing the rat-
ing, yet does not change the rating, the Commission may wish to
proceed further against the rating agency if it believes the agency's
review was negligent. If it chooses to do so, the rating agency will
enjoy a presumption of due care. This may be rebutted by the Com-
mission establishing negligence or conflict of interest. The standard
should be the same standard used for all negligence cases. Here, it
would be that duty of care owed by an ordinary, reasonable rating
agency in similar circumstances.197 If the Commission establishes the
rating agency's negligence, it would have discretion to impose eco-
nomic fines on the rating agency or, in special circumstances, to is-
sue injunctive orders.
B. Regulation of Ratings of Insurance Companies
Regulation of insurance-company ratings would be similar to that
of the financial securities market. The NAIC or an independent
commission would oversee regulation. Here, however, a need perhaps
exists for establishing minimum standards in assessing the solvency
of insurance companies. Though the strength of an insurance com-
pany's investment portfolio is a dominant measure of its solvency,
new factors should be included when necessary. 198 Recently, rating
agencies have decided to include consumer confidence as a factor in
rating insurance companies. 99 These minimum standards are neces-
sary because the insurance industry plays a crucial role in the na-
tion's financial system. Consumer confidence in the industry has
197. Because the standard is a theoretical one, it would be sufficient even if no
other rating agency was acting reasonably. The standard is a normative one, and thus
specifies how an agency ought to act, not how other agencies are in fact acting.
198. For example, in the 1970s insurance companies began issuing new variable-
rate life insurance, in which the interest rate was tied to market rates. This forced the
insurance companies to seek new investment options when market rates increased. Berg,
supra note 47, at Al. An event such as this should cause the rating agencies to scrutinize
the safety of the new investment and include such evaluation in their rating process.
199. See, e.g., Schachner & McLeod, supra note 57, at 1 (A.M. Best, seeking to
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been substantially eroded due to recent failures of insurance
companies.
The minimum standards would not be mandatory, but would be
considered in evaluating the rating agency's action if the commission
pursued action against the rating agency for failure to change a rat-
ing after being issued a writ. Compliance with the minimum stan-
dards would raise a presumption of due care. Action which did not
comply with such minimum standards would raise a presumption of
negligence.
Another important aspect of regulation of insurance company rat-
ing agencies is that communication and cooperation with state insur-
ance regulators are needed. Although most insurance companies are
huge, multi-billion-dollar companies that conduct business in many
states, no national insurance law exists.200 Regulation is left to the
individual states. State regulators, however, often do not communi-
cate with one another. When First Executive Life of California was
forced by state regulators to reduce its reported net worth by $180
million in 1986, state regulators did not force it to change its finan-
cial statements in other states where it did business, nor did they
communicate this important information to state regulators in those
other states.20' With this type of poor performance by, and coopera-
tion among, state insurance regulators, the function of rating agen-
cies assumes added importance. Rating agencies are needed even
more in the insurance industry than in the financial securities indus-
try to warn consumers about insurers that are on shaky financial
assess an insurer's ability to withstand a "run on the bank" by jittery policyholders want-
ing to cash in their insurance contracts, announced in 1991 that it had added a "policy-
holder confidence factor" to its rating analysis).
200. In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-86 (1868), the Supreme
Court held that insurance contracts were local transactions, and not subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause, Article I § 8 of the U.S. Constitution. However,
Paul was overruled in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944), which held that an insurance contract between an insurer and a policyholder
from different states was interstate commerce and thus subject to federal regulation.
However, despite Congress' enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1992), state regulation of the insurance industry predominates.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that "Congress declares that the continued regula-
tion and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." Id. § 1011.
201. Kristoff, supra note 64. See also Perlmutter & Russo, supra note 85, at 20
("[E]ffective national oversight of the insurance industry does not exist primarily because
regulators fail to work together or take timely, appropriate action when a problem in-
surer is identified .... [T]roubled insurers are able to operate for extended periods -
often years - without being forced to resolve their problems.").
ground.
The commission could serve an important communicative purpose.
Even if the commission decides not to issue a Writ of Review, it
could alert state regulators to perceived dangers. State regulators
could then monitor more closely the insurance company, or take in-
dependent action.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Any proposed regulation of rating agencies raises significant issues
concerning the First Amendment's guarantee of the freedom of the
press. Although a full discussion of this issue is impossible in this
Comment, a few of the more serious issues must be examined. These
issues are: (A) Is the current mandatory registration with the SEC
of NRSROs as investment advisers under the 1940 Investment Ad-
visers Act valid?; Does mandatory registration of rating agencies
with the SEC raise serious First Amendment concerns?; (B) Does
further regulation of rating agencies raise serious First Amendment
concerns?
A. Mandatory Registration of Rating Agencies With the SEC
Currently, all NRSROs must register with the SEC as "invest-
ment advisers," as that term is used in the 1940 Investment Advisers
Act.2"2 Further, it has been suggested that any proposed legislation
of rating agencies include a provision explicitly mandating such re-
gistration." 3 The issue is whether such mandatory registration is re-
quired under the Investment Advisers Act, and whether it would be
valid under the First Amendment if included in future legislation.
Although all NRSROs currently are required to register with the
SEC, a challenge of this requirement by a NRSRO would probably
be successful. In Lowe v. SEC,2 °4 the United States Supreme Court
held that the publisher of an investment newsletter was within the
exclusion of the Investment Advisers Act for the publisher of any
bona fide newspaper, news magazine, or financial publication of gen-
eral circulation, 0 5 and thus not subject to the registration require-
ments of the Act.20 6 Because the publication of ratings is similar to
202. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 21 (1988).
203. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
204. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1)(D) (1988).
206. 472 U.S. at 210-11. Justice White, however, disagreed with this conclusion,
arguing that such a newsletter should fall within the definition of investment adviser
under the Act. He stated that "[n]othing in the legislative history of the statute supports
a construction of 'investment adviser' that would exclude persons who offer investment
advice only through such publications as newsletters and reports." Id. at 219 (White, J.,
concurring).
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the publication of the financial newsletter involved in Lowe, 207 rating
agencies probably also qualify for the Act's exemption for publishers
of bona fide financial publications of general circulation. Thus, the
SEC probably could not continue to require rating agencies to regis-
ter with it under the Act if challenged on the issue.
A further issue is whether a provision in future legislation man-
dating similar registration with the SEC would pass constitutional
muster. Although such a requirement would raise constitutional is-
sues, it would clearly be constitutional.2 0 8 Requiring rating agencies
to register with the SEC is a minimum burden on rating agencies
and does not restrict the publication of ratings.
B. Further Regulation of Rating Agencies
The real First Amendment issues are raised by regulation that im-
poses further requirements than just registration. Although the Su-
preme Court did not decide Lowe on constitutional grounds,20 9
Justice White stated in his concurrence, which was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, that he would have decided
the case on First Amendment grounds. Justice White distinguished
between the giving of personalized advice to one particular client
and the general publication of impersonal advice to the public; it is
the regulation of the latter that raises serious First Amendment
concerns.
21 0
Although the regulation of rating agencies would raise First
Amendment concerns, the standard of review that would be applied
207. See In Re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 379287 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
The court noted that "S&P's publications have all the attributes identified by the Su-
preme Court in Lowe as indicative of the press. S&P publishes periodicals with a regular
circulation to a general population .... Furthermore, unlike stockbrokers or personal
investment advisors, S&P does not advise specific clients on their purchases or sales and
has no personal interest in whether its subscribers actually purchase the securities which
it rates." Id. at **4•
208. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 225 n.8 ("Similarly, the application of the Act's re-
porting requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4, to investment advisers whose activities are re-
stricted to publishing would not appear to raise serious First Amendment concerns.")
(White, J., concurring).
209. As mentioned, the Court decided the case through interpretation of the In-
vestment Advisers Act's exemption for publishers of bona fide financial publications of
general publication. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
210. 472 U.S. at 232 ("Where the personal nexus between professional and client
does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any
particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted, government
regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only
incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such
•.. •).
is unclear. However, for reasons explained below, the limited regula-
tion proposed in this paper would probably survive any constitutional
challenge. Uncertainty exists with respect to what standard of review
would be applied because no court has ever been squarely presented
with the issue of regulation of rating agencies.211 The Supreme
Court's decision in Lowe, however, provides a clue as to what stan-
dard might be applied. On the one hand, the activity of the rating
agency might be considered commercial speech. In that case, a re-
duced level of scrutiny would be applied. Justice White indicated
that under this standard of review, regulation will be upheld so long
as a significant government interest is furthered by the regulation.212
Furthermore, Justice White stated that the government interest at
issue in Lowe, the protection of the public from disreputable invest-
ment advisers,21 3 was legitimate. The government's interest at stake
in the legislation of rating agencies proposed in this Comment,
namely, the assurance of the integrity of United States capital mar-
kets and the protection of the public from inaccurate ratings, is simi-
larly a legitimate and significant government interest that would
survive a First Amendment challenge.
Justice White did not reach the issue of whether a publication of a
financial newsletter would be treated as commercial speech and thus
receive reduced protection, or whether it would be entitled to full
First Amendment protection.21 4 Instead, he decided that the SEC's
proposed injunction against Lowe's publication of the financial news-
letter was a prior restraint against speech, and thus presumptively
invalid.215 Central to Justice White's opinion was that the SEC
sought to enjoin the publication of Lowe's newsletter based upon
Lowe's past conduct, rather than basing such injunction on affirma-
tive proof that Lowe's newsletter was false or misleading.216 Thus,
Justice White would have refused the SEC's request for an injunc-
tion even if a reduced commercial speech standard of review had
been used.2
17
The action called for by the SEC in the legislation called for in
this Comment, however, is inapposite to the SEC action at issue in
211. See, e.g., In Re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., supra note 207, at **3 ("We
have found no case, and the parties have cited none, which analyzes whether S & P or
similar organizations constitute the press under the First Amendment.").
212. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
213. Id. at 234 ("The interest here is certainly legitimate: the Government wants
to prevent investors from falling into the hands of scoundrels and swindlers.").
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 234-35.
217. Id. at 235.
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Lowe, and poses less drastic means to further the legitimate govern-
ment interest in protecting investors. The legislation proposed here
would not be considered a prior restraint. Unlike the SEC's action in
Lowe, which was based upon a concern for possible future abuse by
Lowe, the proposed legislation of rating agencies outlined in this
Comment would authorize SEC action only if objective information
indicates that events in the past suggest that a re-evaluation of a
rating is desirable and has not been forthcoming. Thus, the issuance
of a Writ of Review by the SEC would not be considered a prior
restraint of speech.
Further, even if a heightened level of scrutiny is applied to regula-
tion of rating agencies, the regulation proposed in this Comment
would withstand a constitutional challenge. The proposed legislation
is narrowly tailored and furthers a significant government interest."'8
Thus, whether the activity of rating agencies is considered commer-
cial speech or regular speech, 19 the legislation proposed here com-
plies with the mandate of the First Amendment220 that Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined various allegations of the failure of
rating agencies to downgrade quickly enough, political influence, in-
accuracy and lack of disclosure, and unsolicited ratings. Ratings are
important in the promulgation of federal regulations, and are used
by the SEC to justify exempting issuers of securities from the regis-
tration and disclosure requirements of federal regulations. Even if
serious current problems with rating agencies were not prevalent, the
extreme reliance placed by the SEC on ratings merits the limited
regulation of rating agencies outlined in this Comment.
Rating agencies, as members of the media, enjoy the protection of
the First Amendment. The First Amendment, however, has always
218. See id. at 236 ("I see no infirmity in defining the term 'investment adviser' to
include a publisher like petitioner, and I would by no means foreclose the application of,
for example, the Act's antifraud or reporting provisions to investment advisers (registered
or unregistered) who offer their advice through publications.") (White, J. concurring).
219. See In Re Scott Paper Co. See. Litig., supra note 207. The court mentioned,
without giving reasons for its conclusion, that the publication of a bond rating by Stan-
dard & Poor's is not commercial speech. Id. at **4. However, the court noted that
forcing Standard & Poor's to disclose information regarding its discussions with the com-
pany whose bonds it rated might not chill free speech as much as forcing some other
entity or member of the press to disclose information asserted to be privileged, and thus
might not raise as significant a First Amendment issue. Id.
220. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
sought to achieve a balance between the free flow of information and
prevention of harm to others. If rating agencies only had an impact
on sophisticated investors well-equipped to guard against injury
caused by negligently disseminated information, then the current lia-
bility of rating agencies would not merit reconsideration. However,
the opposite is true. Individual investors in both the financial securi-
ties and insurance industries rely daily on ratings to make invest-
ment decisions. Furthermore, the SEC relies heavily on the quasi-
regulatory rating agencies to restrict the amount of financial infor-
mation disseminated to the public. Given the current situation, the
limited regulation suggested in this Comment is needed to ensure
that the use of ratings in the federal securities laws continues to pro-
mote protection of individual investors.
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